You acquired a platform growing at 25% year-over-year. The Investment Committee thesis was simple: standard SaaS multiple expansion. But six months post-close, the CFO's monthly pack tells a different story. Gross margins are hovering at 62%, not the 78% promised in the CIM. You didn't buy a software company; you bought a tech-enabled services firm with a subscription billing model.
In the zero-interest rate era (ZIRP), this distinction was often glossed over. Growth masked inefficiency. But in 2025, the market has ruthlessly corrected. According to recent data from the Software Equity Group, SaaS companies with gross margins above 80% are now trading at a 105% valuation premium compared to their lower-margin peers. If your portfolio company is sitting in the low 60s, you are effectively capping your exit multiple before you even start the sale process.
The problem is rarely just "pricing." It is usually a structural failure in Unit Economics. Your cloud costs are scaling linearly with revenue (bad code), your "Customer Success" team is actually doing unpaid professional services (bad boundaries), and your legacy contracts are locking in inflation-vulnerable rates. For Operating Partners, fixing Gross Margin is no longer an optimization exercise—it is a rescue mission for the asset's terminal value.
Cloud spend is the silent killer of margin expansion. In many PE-backed assets, AWS or Azure bills are treated as a fixed utility rather than a variable cost to be managed. IDC research indicates that nearly 30% of cloud spend is wasted due to over-provisioning and lack of governance. This isn't just about buying Reserved Instances; it's about architectural hygiene.
We frequently see "single-tenant" architecture sold as multi-tenant SaaS. If every new customer requires a new database instance or a dedicated server, your margins will never scale. This is where Technical Debt is Financial Debt. Remediation here requires forcing Engineering to prioritize "FinOps"—treating cloud cost as a primary code metric, not an afterthought.
If your Gross Margin is below 70%, your Customer Success (CS) team is likely a hidden delivery arm. They aren't just "ensuring adoption"; they are building custom reports, manually onboarding users, and fixing data errors. This is unpaid Professional Services work buried in OpEx (or worse, COGS).
The benchmark for pure-play SaaS Gross Margin is 77-79% (median) and >85% (top quartile), according to RockingWeb's 2025 SaaS Metrics Report. If you have a Services component, it must be priced separately and run at a 40%+ margin. Mixing the two dilutes your valuation. You must harden the product to eliminate the need for manual intervention, or start charging for the intervention.
AI is a double-edged sword for margins. While AI-enhanced features can command a 60-85% price premium, the compute costs can drag margins down to 65-72% if not managed correctly (Monetizely, 2025). The lever here is Packaging. Do not give away AI features in the base license. Isolate high-compute AI features into a specific "Pro" or "Enterprise" tier where the higher price point protects your margin floor.
Waiting for revenue growth to "outrun" bad margins is a fallacy. You need to mechanically engineer margin expansion. Here is the operator's playbook for the next quarter:
Conclusion
Gross Margin is the ultimate measure of your product's scalability. A 60% margin business is a consultancy; an 80% margin business is a software platform. The difference in exit value is often 2x-3x. Stop accepting "pass-through" costs and start engineering your unit economics.
